𝕋𝕙𝕖 β„‚π• π• π•œ π•Šπ•₯π•£π•’π•šπ•₯ π•”π•£π• π•€π•€π•šπ•Ÿπ•˜ π•£π•–π•žπ•’π•šπ•Ÿπ•€ 𝕒 π•›π• π•¦π•£π•Ÿπ•–π•ͺ π•šπ•Ÿπ•₯𝕠 π•₯𝕙𝕖 π•¦π•Ÿπ•œπ•Ÿπ• π•¨π•Ÿ, 𝕓𝕠π•₯𝕙 π•π•šπ•₯𝕖𝕣𝕒𝕝𝕝π•ͺ π•’π•Ÿπ•• π•—π•šπ•Ÿπ•’π•Ÿπ•”π•šπ•’π•π•π•ͺ.

𝕋𝕙𝕖 β„‚π• π• π•œ π•Šπ•₯π•£π•’π•šπ•₯ π•”π•£π• π•€π•€π•šπ•Ÿπ•˜ π•£π•–π•žπ•’π•šπ•Ÿπ•€ 𝕒 π•›π• π•¦π•£π•Ÿπ•–π•ͺ π•šπ•Ÿπ•₯𝕠 π•₯𝕙𝕖 π•¦π•Ÿπ•œπ•Ÿπ• π•¨π•Ÿ, 𝕓𝕠π•₯𝕙 π•π•šπ•₯𝕖𝕣𝕒𝕝𝕝π•ͺ π•’π•Ÿπ•• π•—π•šπ•Ÿπ•’π•Ÿπ•”π•šπ•’π•π•π•ͺ.

𝕋𝕙𝕖 π•˜π• π•§π•–π•£π•Ÿπ•žπ•–π•Ÿπ•₯ 𝕀𝕙𝕠𝕦𝕝𝕕 𝕙𝕒𝕧𝕖 π•œπ•–π•‘π•₯ 𝕃𝕒𝕓𝕠𝕦𝕣’𝕀 π•šβ„π•–π•© 𝕗𝕖𝕣𝕣π•ͺ π•‘π•π•’π•Ÿ 𝕗𝕠𝕣 π•šπ•₯𝕀 π•£π•’π•šπ•-π•–π•Ÿπ•’π•“π•π•–π••, 𝕗𝕦π•₯𝕦𝕣𝕖-𝕑𝕣𝕠𝕠𝕗 π••π•–π•€π•šπ•˜π•Ÿ, 𝕗𝕒𝕀π•₯𝕖𝕣 π•₯π•šπ•žπ•–π•π•šπ•Ÿπ•–, π•’π•Ÿπ•• π•₯π•£π•’π•Ÿπ•€π•‘π•’π•£π•–π•Ÿπ•”π•ͺ, π••π•–π•€π•‘π•šπ•₯𝕖 𝕔𝕠𝕀π•₯𝕀, 𝕣𝕒π•₯𝕙𝕖𝕣 π•₯π•™π•’π•Ÿ 𝕠𝕑π•₯π•šπ•Ÿπ•˜ 𝕗𝕠𝕣 π•’π•Ÿ π•¦π•Ÿπ•”π•π•–π•’π•£, 𝕕𝕖𝕝𝕒π•ͺ𝕖𝕕 𝕒𝕝π•₯π•–π•£π•Ÿπ•’π•₯π•šπ•§π•–.

N

ew Zealand’s coalition government should have stuck with the Labour-led government’s iRex plan to deliver two large, rail-enabled ferries by 2026, rather than scrapping it for a vague, cost-undefined alternative. 

The cancellation of iRexβ€”a project that, despite its flaws, offered a comprehensive, future-proofed solutionβ€”has left the country with a patchwork replacement plan that risks higher long-term costs, delays, and compromised service quality. 

Here’s why sticking with the original vision was the better choice.

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RELATED:
π”½π•šπ•Ÿπ•’π•Ÿπ•”π•– π•„π•šπ•Ÿπ•šπ•€π•₯𝕖𝕣 π•Ÿπ•–π•–π••π•€ π•₯𝕠 π•–π•©π•‘π•π•’π•šπ•Ÿ 𝕗𝕖𝕣𝕣π•ͺ π••π•–π•”π•šπ•€π•šπ• π•Ÿ 𝕔𝕠𝕀π•₯ π•₯𝕠 π•₯𝕒𝕩𝕑𝕒π•ͺ𝕖𝕣

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First, iRex addressed the Cook Strait’s critical infrastructure needs head-on. 

The existing Interislander fleet, operated by KiwiRail, is outdated and unreliable, with incidents like the Aratere’s grounding in 2024 exposing safety risks. 

The iRex ferries, built by Hyundai in South Korea, were designed to handle growing freight and passenger demand while maintaining rail connectivityβ€”a cornerstone of New Zealand’s transport network. 

Scrapping iRex for smaller, potentially non-rail-enabled vessels sacrifices this integration, forcing freight onto trucks and roads, which increases emissions and congestion. 

The coalition’s β€œToyota Corolla” approach, as Finance Minister Nicola Willis framed it, might save money upfront but undermines the long-term efficiency Labour’s β€œFerrari” promised. 

Second, the cost argument against iRex is overstated. 

Yes, the price tag rose from $551 million to $3 billion, driven by port upgrades in Wellington and Picton. But these upgrades were inevitableβ€”aging infrastructure can’t support modern ferries indefinitely. 

By canceling iRex, the government hasn’t eliminated these costs; it’s deferred them. 

The proposed Ferries of the last Labour government iRex project would have been the best option. credit: Kiwrail

Port companies will still need to invest heavily when the new, smaller ferries arrive by 2029, and delaying this work risks inflation-driven price hikes. 

Add the $300 million break fee to Hyundai and $500 million in sunk costs, and the coalition’s savings look illusory. 

Labour’s plan, fully funded at $3 billion, offered a complete packageβ€”ships and portsβ€”avoiding the piecemeal spending now looming. Third, iRex was further along. 

By late 2023, contracts were signed, construction had begun, and delivery was slated for 2026β€”three years ahead of the coalition’s timeline. 

Cancellation disrupted momentum, strained international partnerships, and left KiwiRail scrambling to restart procurement. 

The new plan’s 2029 target assumes no delays, but global supply chain issues and negotiation setbacks could push it further out. 

Meanwhile, the public endures an unreliable service longer than necessary. 

Sticking with iRex would have ensured a faster, more certain resolution to a pressing problem.

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Additional Reading:

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Critics argue Labour mismanaged iRex, pointing to cost overruns and KiwiRail’s $1.47 billion bailout request. 

But this ignores context: the project’s scope grew to meet safety and resilience standards post-Kaikoura earthquake, and global inflation hit shipbuilding hard. 

The coalition’s alternative lacks clarityβ€”costs are undisclosed, and β€œcommercial confidentiality” excuses dodge accountability. 

At least iRex’s $3 billion was a known quantity, debated and budgeted for. 

Now, taxpayers face a mystery bill that could rival iRex once port upgrades are factored in. 

Finally, iRex aligned with New Zealand’s climate and economic goals. 

Rail-enabled ferries supported decarbonisation by keeping freight off roads, while larger vessels boosted tourism and trade capacity. 

The coalition’s leaner vision risks shortchanging these priorities for short-term savings, a classic case of penny-wise, pound-foolish governance.

𝔅𝔯𝔲𝔠𝔒 𝔄𝔩𝔭𝔦𝔫𝔒

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