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New Zealandβs coalition government should have stuck with the Labour-led governmentβs iRex plan to deliver two large, rail-enabled ferries by 2026, rather than scrapping it for a vague, cost-undefined alternative.
The cancellation of iRexβa project that, despite its flaws, offered a comprehensive, future-proofed solutionβhas left the country with a patchwork replacement plan that risks higher long-term costs, delays, and compromised service quality.
Hereβs why sticking with the original vision was the better choice.
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First, iRex addressed the Cook Straitβs critical infrastructure needs head-on.
The existing Interislander fleet, operated by KiwiRail, is outdated and unreliable, with incidents like the Aratereβs grounding in 2024 exposing safety risks.
The iRex ferries, built by Hyundai in South Korea, were designed to handle growing freight and passenger demand while maintaining rail connectivityβa cornerstone of New Zealandβs transport network.
Scrapping iRex for smaller, potentially non-rail-enabled vessels sacrifices this integration, forcing freight onto trucks and roads, which increases emissions and congestion.
The coalitionβs βToyota Corollaβ approach, as Finance Minister Nicola Willis framed it, might save money upfront but undermines the long-term efficiency Labourβs βFerrariβ promised.
Second, the cost argument against iRex is overstated.
Yes, the price tag rose from $551 million to $3 billion, driven by port upgrades in Wellington and Picton. But these upgrades were inevitableβaging infrastructure canβt support modern ferries indefinitely.
By canceling iRex, the government hasnβt eliminated these costs; itβs deferred them.
The proposed Ferries of the last Labour government iRex project would have been the best option. credit: Kiwrail
Port companies will still need to invest heavily when the new, smaller ferries arrive by 2029, and delaying this work risks inflation-driven price hikes.
Add the $300 million break fee to Hyundai and $500 million in sunk costs, and the coalitionβs savings look illusory.
Labourβs plan, fully funded at $3 billion, offered a complete packageβships and portsβavoiding the piecemeal spending now looming. Third, iRex was further along.
By late 2023, contracts were signed, construction had begun, and delivery was slated for 2026βthree years ahead of the coalitionβs timeline.
Cancellation disrupted momentum, strained international partnerships, and left KiwiRail scrambling to restart procurement.
The new planβs 2029 target assumes no delays, but global supply chain issues and negotiation setbacks could push it further out.
Meanwhile, the public endures an unreliable service longer than necessary.
Sticking with iRex would have ensured a faster, more certain resolution to a pressing problem.
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Critics argue Labour mismanaged iRex, pointing to cost overruns and KiwiRailβs $1.47 billion bailout request.
But this ignores context: the projectβs scope grew to meet safety and resilience standards post-Kaikoura earthquake, and global inflation hit shipbuilding hard.
The coalitionβs alternative lacks clarityβcosts are undisclosed, and βcommercial confidentialityβ excuses dodge accountability.
At least iRexβs $3 billion was a known quantity, debated and budgeted for.
Now, taxpayers face a mystery bill that could rival iRex once port upgrades are factored in.
Finally, iRex aligned with New Zealandβs climate and economic goals.
Rail-enabled ferries supported decarbonisation by keeping freight off roads, while larger vessels boosted tourism and trade capacity.
The coalitionβs leaner vision risks shortchanging these priorities for short-term savings, a classic case of penny-wise, pound-foolish governance.
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